1. Home
  2. Studien
  3. Contradictory welfare conditioning: Differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants
Externe Veröffentlichung 22. Juli 2020 Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke in Review of International Political Economy Contradictory welfare conditioning: Differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants

The New Liberal Dilemma predicts that European universal welfare states lose support among natives due to large immigration numbers. This article contributes to the debate regarding the validity of the argument posited by the New Liberal Dilemma by examining the contradictory combination of support for a popular welfare state reform, Universal Basic Income (UBI), and conditionality for immigrants’ access to the welfare state in 20 European countries.

Zum Download
Externe Veröffentlichung
Differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants
Externe Veröffentlichung 22. Juli 2020 Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke in Review of International Political Economy

Contradictory welfare conditioning: Differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants

Artikel in Review of International Political Economy

Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke in Review of International Political Economy Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW)

The New Liberal Dilemma predicts that European universal welfare states lose support among natives due to large immigration numbers. This article contributes to the debate regarding the validity of the argument posited by the New Liberal Dilemma by examining the contradictory combination of support for a popular welfare state reform, Universal Basic Income (UBI), and conditionality for immigrants’ access to the welfare state in 20 European countries.

Even though UBI is unconditional, two thirds of UBI supporters want to impose significant conditions on immigrants’ access to the welfare state and thus exhibit contradictory and chauvinistic welfare state preferences. UBI supporters consist of different groups of respondents that are chauvinist. Nativists hold strong anti-immigration attitudes and want to exclude immigrants entirely from welfare benefits, while reciprocity chauvinists are willing to grant immigrants access to the welfare state once immigrants prove themselves to be deserving of benefits by paying taxes for at least a year. In contrast to the welfare magnet hypothesis, inconsistent and chauvinist preferences among UBI supporters are least common in rich European countries with large welfare states. On the macro-level, our findings are independent of countries’ engagement with communism and the share of foreign-born people.

Zum Download
Externe Veröffentlichung
Differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants
Externe Veröffentlichung 22. Juli 2020 Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke in Review of International Political Economy

Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke: Contradictory welfare conditioning—differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants

Artikel in Review of International Political Economy

Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke in Review of International Political Economy Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW)

Mehr zum Thema

Mehr zum Thema

Artikel lesen
Mitarbeiterin Öffentlicher Dienst am Desktop-Computer arbeitend.
IW-Kurzbericht Nr. 58 1. September 2026 Björn Kauder

Öffentlicher Dienst: Potenziale durch mehr Vollzeit

Der öffentliche Dienst beklagt einen Personalmangel, der sich in den kommenden Jahren noch verschärfen dürfte. Der bezifferte Bedarf ließe sich rein rechne-risch zu einem erheblichen Teil durch eine Auswei-tung der Tätigkeit in Richtung Vollzeit decken.

Björn Kauder IW

Artikel lesen
IW-Kurzbericht Nr. 45 7. Juli 2026 Martin Beznoska / Tobias Hentze

Steuerreform sieht keinen Ausgleich der kalten Progression vor

Die geplante Reform der Einkommensteuer entlastet zwar gezielt kleine und mittlere Einkommen, bleibt insgesamt aber deutlich hinter einer echten Tarifreform zurück. Vor allem der unvollständige Ausgleich der kalten Progression führt im Jahr 2028 zu realen Steuererhöhungen.

Martin Beznoska / Tobias Hentze IW

Mehr zum Thema

Inhaltselement mit der ID 8880