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Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke in Review of International Political Economy External Publication 22. July 2020 Contradictory welfare conditioning: Differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants

The New Liberal Dilemma predicts that European universal welfare states lose support among natives due to large immigration numbers. This article contributes to the debate regarding the validity of the argument posited by the New Liberal Dilemma by examining the contradictory combination of support for a popular welfare state reform, Universal Basic Income (UBI), and conditionality for immigrants’ access to the welfare state in 20 European countries.

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External Publication
Differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants
Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke in Review of International Political Economy External Publication 22. July 2020

Contradictory welfare conditioning: Differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants

Article in Review of International Political Economy

German Economic Institute (IW) German Economic Institute (IW)

The New Liberal Dilemma predicts that European universal welfare states lose support among natives due to large immigration numbers. This article contributes to the debate regarding the validity of the argument posited by the New Liberal Dilemma by examining the contradictory combination of support for a popular welfare state reform, Universal Basic Income (UBI), and conditionality for immigrants’ access to the welfare state in 20 European countries.

Even though UBI is unconditional, two thirds of UBI supporters want to impose significant conditions on immigrants’ access to the welfare state and thus exhibit contradictory and chauvinistic welfare state preferences. UBI supporters consist of different groups of respondents that are chauvinist. Nativists hold strong anti-immigration attitudes and want to exclude immigrants entirely from welfare benefits, while reciprocity chauvinists are willing to grant immigrants access to the welfare state once immigrants prove themselves to be deserving of benefits by paying taxes for at least a year. In contrast to the welfare magnet hypothesis, inconsistent and chauvinist preferences among UBI supporters are least common in rich European countries with large welfare states. On the macro-level, our findings are independent of countries’ engagement with communism and the share of foreign-born people.

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External Publication
Differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants
Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke in Review of International Political Economy External Publication 22. July 2020

Matthias Diermeier / Judith Niehues / Joel Reinecke: Contradictory welfare conditioning—differing welfare support for natives versus immigrants

Article in Review of International Political Economy

German Economic Institute (IW) German Economic Institute (IW)

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The Challenges to the Sustainability of Germany’s Public Finances
Martin Beznoska / Tobias Hentze / Katja Rietzler / Martin Werding IW-Trends No. 3 24. August 2023

The Challenges to the Sustainability of Germany’s Public Finances

The German government’s fiscal responses to the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war in an attempt to cushion their impact have driven up the country’s general government debt-to-GDP ratio.

IW

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Beznoska, Martin / Christian von Haldenwang / Ruth Maria Schüler in IDOS (Hrsg.) Discussion Paper External Publication 15. March 2023

Tax expenditures in OECD countries: Findings from the Global Tax Expenditures Database

The Global Tax Expenditures Database (https://GTED.net/) collects national reports on tax expenditures for 101 countries for the period from 1990 to the present. Based on these data, the development of tax expenditures in the 38 OECD countries between 1999 and ...

IW

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