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IW-Report No. 46 30. October 2026 Daniel Muncaster/ Thomas Obst / Samina Sultan US midterm elections: Unfulfilled promises

Two years after US President Donald Trump’s re-election, the US midterm elections on November 3, 2026 offer the first nationwide referendum on his second term.

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The state of the US economy and democracy
IW-Report No. 46 30. October 2026 Daniel Muncaster/ Thomas Obst / Samina Sultan

US midterm elections: Unfulfilled promises

Daniel Muncaster/ Thomas Obst / Samina Sultan German Economic Institute (IW) German Economic Institute (IW)

Two years after US President Donald Trump’s re-election, the US midterm elections on November 3, 2026 offer the first nationwide referendum on his second term.

This report assesses whether the administration has kept its economic promises and whether the elections can or will change the direction of US economic and foreign policy.

This report focus on three fundamental pillars of President Trump’s economic policy: a loose fiscal policy reducing tax burdens, a trade policy which includes unilateral tariffs, and the effort to revitalize domestic manufacturing and support investment in artificial intelligence (AI). An analysis of the actual economic development since President Trump took office in January 2025 shows a mixed picture of success and highlights the fragility of the current US growth model. While GDP growth remains robust and investment is increasing substantially, the labor market adds fewer jobs than under the previous US administration and inflation has been well above the US Federal Reserve’s (Fed) target of two percent, which adds to the ongoing affordability crisis in the US. The US-Israeli war against Iran adds to the high government debt and increases interest rates further, forcing lenders to question the sustainability of the US government’s outstanding debt of 40 trillion US dollars. While investment in AI is indeed dynamic and drives overall GDP growth, its outsized importance in the US economy contributes to fragility which might backfire through wealth concentration and financial market volatility.

One of the central aims of the Trump administration has been to reduce the US goods trade deficit by introducing a wide range of US import tariffs. However, since there are dominant macroeconomic factors driving the US goods trade deficit, the tariffs have not led to a sustained reduction so far. In August 2026 the monthly total US goods trade deficit amounted to 130 billion US dollars, which is higher than in the same month two years ago. But the composition of the total goods trade deficit changed, as US tariffs vary by country or region as well as by product groups. In August 2026, the EU only accounted for 7 percent of the total US trade deficit, whereas it made up 20 percent in August 2024. This is less because of a significant reduction in US imports from the EU, but more because the US exports more goods, especially energy products, to the EU. China’s share also reduced to 14 percent from 29 percent two years ago. Instead, Mexico and Vietnam now each account for 20 percent of the total US’ goods trade deficit. The absolute value of the US’s goods trade deficit with Germany remained relatively stable throughout the first two years of Trump’s second term in office.

Decreasing the US’ goods trade deficit is part of a bigger project of the current US administration to bring back manufacturing to the US. In this vein, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the US should be increased. Analyzing total FDI flows to the US using data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, this strategy has not been successful so far: FDI inflow amounted to 248 billion US dollars in 2025, which is a reduction of 8.2 percent to the previous year and 18 percent when compared to the average over the period 2015-2024. Concentrating on FDI flows from the EU to the US only, there was a slight increase of 1.4 percent in 2025 compared 2024, but a decrease of 12 percent compared to the average value over the previous ten years. The trend of investment inflows from German companies to the US is unclear: While the US data indicates an increase of 40 percent in 2025, data from the German Bundesbank German records a decrease of 21 percent. Turning to worldwide manufacturing FDI flows to the US, there is a slight increase of 3.3 percent to 114 billion US dollars in 2025 compared to 2024, but in comparison to the average value for 2015-2024 this is still a decrease of around 20 percent. This negative trend also holds for EU manufacturing FDI flows to the US.

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The state of the US economy and democracy
IW-Report No. 46 30. October 2026 Daniel Muncaster/ Thomas Obst / Samina Sultan

US midterm elections: Unfulfilled promises

Daniel Muncaster/ Thomas Obst / Samina Sultan German Economic Institute (IW) German Economic Institute (IW)

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Go West? Serbia under Vučić
IW-Report No. 45 29. October 2026 Alexander Radunz / Gero Kunath

Go West? Serbia under Vučić

Aleksandar Vučić had led Serbia since 2014, first as prime minister and from 2017 as president, until his rule ended in October 2026 in a landslide defeat by the Student List. This report assesses the political and economic record of his twelve years in power.

Alexander Radunz / Gero Kunath IW

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IW-Report No. 39 6. October 2026 Samina Sultan / Jürgen Matthes

German Foreign Investment and the debate over Germany as a business location

Geopolitical pressure and the debate over Germany’s competitiveness make it necessary to develop a more precise understanding of German foreign direct investment. This report provides a comprehensive empirical analysis and also examines the implications for Germany as a business location.

Samina Sultan / Jürgen Matthes IW

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