More defense with less USA?

At the same time as the US presidential election, the German government coalition collapsed and new elections were necessary. In a feat of negotiation, the CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor, Friedrich Merz, managed to use the two-thirds majority of democratic parties in the old Bundestag to exempt increased defense spending from the restrictions of the debt brake before the new Bundestag was constituted. This means that in the current legislative period, an increase in defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2029 could be financed by additional borrowing of 264 billion euros. Compared to previous plans, this means a possible additional expenditure of 194 billion euros. This policy paper examines the question of how the funds now available can be used in a sensible way to increase the Bundeswehr size in terms of personnel and material, given the restriction of a presumably tight timeframe until Europe must be capable of its defense independent from the Unites States.

The German armed forces’ manpower problem has worsened in the last three years, as the number of soldiers has fallen by 3,000 to 181,000 at the end of 2024 instead of growing towards 203,000 as planned. Possible solutions include increased recruitment efforts combined with financial incentives. Partial conscription based on the Swedish model, or the reintroduction of compulsory military service are also being discussed, particularly in view of the even higher personnel requirements in the event of a US withdrawal from Europe. Despite the special fund of 100 billion euros from 2022, there are still deficiencies in the Bundeswehr's material equipment, which should be addressed through larger, preferably European-coordinated orders for weapons and ammunition with long-term order security for industry to enlarge capacities accordingly. To this end, the Bundeswehr's procurement system must also be simplified and accelerated. Instead of highly complex ‘gold-edge solutions’, more robust and less expensive systems must be procured, at least in part, which can be delivered quickly in larger numbers and also enable reserve units to be equipped. Lessons from the war in Ukraine have to be incorporated in the procurement decisions, too. Replacing US capabilities in Europe in the conventional sector would probably require a timeframe of 10 to 12 years, even in the best-case scenario. In order to be able to plan in a realistic way, close coordination must continue to take place with the USA to organize the transfer of responsibility to Germany and Europe.