U.S. dependence on imports from the EU

It is shown that the US’s dependence on imports from the EU is significant and that, following a sharp increase, this dependence is now even higher than the US's dependence on imports from China. In addition, US dependence on imports from the EU has been continuously high for the last five years in almost 180 product groups that can be classified as strategic.

In 2024, there were 3,120 product groups in which the US imported at least 50 percent of all imports in the respective groups from the EU. That is around 17.5 per cent of the approximately 17,800 HTSUS product groups in which the US imported from any country in the world in 2024. This represents a total import value of around 290 billion US dollars – equivalent to a good 46 per cent of total US imports from the EU of 618 billion US dollars in 2024. In other words, almost every second US dollar imported from the EU is accounted for by a product group in which the US import share from the EU is at least 50 per cent. Even with higher minimum import share thresholds, relatively high numbers of goods can be identified (over 1,440 at the 75 per cent threshold, 726 at the 90 per cent threshold and 293 product groups at the 100 per cent threshold). These product groups are spread quite broadly across the production spectrum and include not only many capital goods and intermediate goods, but also consumer goods such as food and textiles.

The US's dependence on imports from the EU has risen significantly since 2010. This applies to all minimum import thresholds considered. For the threshold of 50 per cent, the number of relevant product groups has increased by 19 per cent, from over 2,600 to more than 3,100 goods. At the same time, the total import value of these goods rose from 116 to 287 billion US dollars, an increase of almost 150 per cent.

The more persistent a high share of US imports from the EU is, the more difficult it tends to be for US buyers to replace EU goods, although further information is needed to draw this conclusion. Over the last five years, more than 1,300 goods with a total US import value of 132 billion US dollars have consistently reached the minimum threshold of 50 per cent. In terms of value, this represents a good 21 per cent of all US imports from the EU and 46 per cent of goods with a minimum import share of 50 per cent in 2024. Accordingly, this means that for almost every second US import from the EU where the US import share from the EU currently amounts to at least 50 per cent, this has also been the case consistently over the last five years.

In comparison to China, the EU is now clearly ahead in terms of both the number and total value of goods accounting for at least 50 per cent of US imports. By 2024, China only accounted for 2,925 goods with a total US import value of 247 billion US dollars. In the course of an obvious de-risking process, US import dependence on China has decreased significantly over time.  

Considering US imports from Germany accounting for at least 50 per cent, there are 466 product groups with a total US import value of 18 billion US dollars. That is around 11 per cent of total US imports from Germany in 2024. There are over 190 goods at the 75 per cent threshold, over 100 at the 90 per cent threshold and still 43 at the 100 per cent threshold. Among the goods with such a very high US import dependence on Germany, industrial products play a much bigger role than for the EU. Over time, US import dependence on Germany has tended to stagnate. Over the last five years, the minimum import threshold of 50 per cent has been consistently reached by 153 goods with a total US import value from Germany of 7.8 billion US dollars.

In order to narrow the analysis to goods that are important for industrial uses in the US and that tend to be difficult to replace, a general focus group is considered. The filter criteria to create this group are a consistent US import share from the EU of at least 50 per cent over the last five years, belonging to a predominantly industry-related product category, and a US import surplus in total goods trade. After applying these filters, 790 goods remain in the general focus group out of the 3,120 goods with a US import share from the EU of at least 50 per cent in 2024. These goods account for a total US import value of 92.2 billion US dollars in 2024, which corresponds to around 15 per cent of all US imports from the EU. Three categories of goods play a particularly important role, accounting for almost 79 per cent of the total number of goods and around 73 per cent of the total value of goods in the focus group: primarily chemical and related products, but also machinery/equipment/electrotechnical goods and, to a lesser extent, base metals and articles thereof.  

In order to determine for which strategically relevant goods the US import dependency on the EU is continuously high, the general focus group is compared with various lists of goods of high technological, industrial and military strategic importance. This results in a strategic focus group of 179 goods and a total US import value from the EU in 2024 of around 38.5 billion US dollars. In terms of value, products from the chemical and related goods dominate, while in terms of quantity, this is the case for machinery/equipment/electrotechnical goods. When breaking down the total value of the strategic focus group by individual EU Member States, more than 50 per cent of the value is accounted for by Ireland. Germany follows in second place with around 21 per cent. However, when broken down at the disaggregated goods level to individual EU countries, Germany is clearly in the lead. In 89 of the 179 strategic product groups Germany accounts for at least 30 per cent of the total US import value from the EU, for the 90 per cent value threshold this is the case for 19 goods.

Based on these findings, the following economic policy recommendations are derived: 

• A government-based taskforce should be established to analyse international value chains in order to identify truly critical dependencies in trade, be it those of Germany on other countries or those of our trading partners on Germany.  
• The results clearly show that the EU can conduct tariff negotiations with the United States from a stronger position. This is because US import dependency on the EU is significantly higher than generally assumed. EU goods with consistently high US import shares are likely to be difficult to replace in the short term. This implies that mostly the US economy is likely to bear the burden of higher tariffs – as was the case during Trump's first term with US tariffs on imports from China. The high level of US import dependency makes the pending US threat of even higher tariffs on EU goods less credible, because there is a serious risk that the US economy will be cut off from essential goods so that US businesses would push hard for de-escalation as was the case in the recent US trade conflict with China. On top of this, in the event of an escalating tariff conflict EU export restrictions could ultimately be considered as a last resort for products where critical US dependencies can be identified.
• The European single market and trade with Europe should be further strengthened. With greater external pressure, Europe needs more economic strength internally. It is therefore important to strengthen growth through reforms to increase competitiveness and to further dismantle trade barriers in Europe. 
• In order to become less dependent on US sales, negotiations on free trade agreements with emerging economies must be concluded quickly. To this end, the EU needs more pragmatism, creative solutions to win over even protectionist partners such as India and Indonesia, and a targeted but decisive approach to political resistance from the agricultural sector.